DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 105 342 CG 009 713

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TITLE International Conflict Resolution Workshops.
PUB DATE 30 Aug 74
NOTE 37p.; Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association (82nd, New Orleans, Louisiana, August 30, 1974); Page 37 may reproduce poorly

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.76 HC-$1.95 PLUS POSTAGE
DESCRIPTORS *Communication Problems; *Conflict Resolution; Foreign Relations; *Group Dynamics; *Interaction; International Law; *Problem Solving; Speeches; Workshops

ABSTRACT

This paper describes two attempts to utilize a conflict resolution approach in academic settings. The approach includes: (1) the significance of the structure of communication between parties in conflict; (2) the understanding of face-to-face interaction processes; (3) problems of perceptual distortion; and (4) political socializations. The participants in the workshop were citizens from nations in conflict. The first workshop was designed to study the Egyptian-Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while the second focused on the Bangladesh-Pakistan-India conflict. The uses of the workshop are discussed, followed by an explanation of the design, the pre-planning stage, and the recruitment process. Further sections of the paper include discussions of: (1) leadership style, (2) conflict fractionation exercises, (3) role reversal, and (4) communication exercises. An analysis of workshop content is presented, centering around the prioritizing of identity issues. Conflict may be a resultant, among other things, of the attempt to satisfy all elements of identity rather than assigning them priorities and dealing only with those high on the list. (Author/BW)

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International Conflict Resolution Workshops

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CG 009 713

Paper prepared originally for the American Psychological Association Annual Convention

New Orleans, Louisiana, August 30, 1974.

For the session: The Induction of Cooperation between Hostile and Distrusting Parties

Perhaps it seems more pretentious than helpful for psychologists to turn their attention to the study of international conflict and its reduction. After all we do not come to this arena of human concern fresh from having solved inter-racial conflict, inter-class conflict, inter-generational conflict or other forms of conflict where the entities in conflict are the usual subject matter of psychologists, especially social psychologists.

Justification for this attention, emerges clearly from comparing the sorry catalog of protracted, murderous conflicts to a list of the paucity of methods of reducing conflict, much less inducing cooperation, among these hostile groups. There is a pressing human problem to be confronted.

The international conflict resolution workshop provides a kind of contact between conflicting parties that is well-suited to the psychologist as researcher and as third-party intervener in conflict resolution. It emphasizes the significance of the structure of communication between parties in conflict, and engages the understanding of face-to-face interaction processes, problems of perceptual distortion, and of political socialization.

The present paper will describe briefly two modest attempts to utilize this approach conducted in academic settings. The participants in the workshop were native citizens from each of the parties in conflict. The first workshop was designed to study the Egyptian-Israeli-Palestinian conflicts; the second workshop focused on the Bangladesh-Pakistan-India conflicts.

Interaction Between Hostile National Groups

The range of interaction between hostile international parties becomes more and more constricted as the conflict between them becomes more intense and more ramified in the lives of individual nationals. Even the most informal contact may be frowned upon, so that public political debate and the exchange of threats and warnings become the only forms of communication. The barrier of geographical separation reinforces this limited communication. The barrier may only be crossed by armed forces.

In situations of domination by one party of another, interaction may occur. Such interaction is, however, never interaction of equal status, where the

possibility of open expression and of the development of new ideas, is present.

The workshop approach provides an unofficial, relatively informal opportunity for contact between participants in these conflicts. Since the sponsorship does involve few political commitments on the part of participants, the workshop can be a permissible locus of direct contact in the absence of the more conventional forms.

In the context of Soviet-American relations we have become familiar with the kinds of communication available to begin reducing tension. First, there is athletic competition. This is often a first level of contact because it reproduces conflict and competition as well as direct contact in a non-hostile environment, and has no direct reference to political matters. Furthermore, athletic contact has strict enforceable rules of its own, such as the rituals of flag raising, and including legitimized punishment (penalties) for the use of violence or the infringement of rules.

Somewhat less structured than sports, is scientific exchange and the scientific conference. The form and content of discussion is somewhat ritualized, national achievements are understated and perhaps represented as individual achievements, and the goal is explicitly cooperative. Scientific conferences may occasionally, and more frequently do, enter directly into political areas but they ostensibly transcend political issues.

Cultural exchange is also permitted as conflict is reduced. Like the other forms of contacts, it is a symbol that conflict is not total, that governments are enemies rather than whole cultures and whole peoples. At least, there are some things that the conflicting parties can share with each other. In addition, there may be individual travel and business contact.

Equal status contact of these kinds even though, it does not explicitly confront the political relations between the groups is minimal or non-existent in some intense conflict, such as the ones which were the subjects of the workshops here. Not only is there no direct and little indirect political communication or negotiation, but the non-political channels of sports, culture and science are closed. Travel and other individual contact are

prohibited by law and social sanction. The conflict is seen as all-encompassing and the chances of humanization of the adversary are very limited.

In such a context, the workshop is a unique opportunity for contact. The two sides may interact only as superordinate-subordinate in the political power relationship. The workshop provides equal status contact. The workshop allows communication without a formal commitment to a change of definition in the political relationship (e.g., non-recognition) as would be the case under political sponorship or auspices such as the United Nations. Furthermore, the workshops allow for explicit political discussion, rather than artistic or athletic contact.

In such total conflicts, the workshop itself has the function of (1) legitimating contact of an informal kind between the parties (2) humanizing the perception of the other side in that they are capable of non-violent communication and willing to interact without the use of force, (3) legitimating contact without prior political agreement. Prior conditions can become a kind of political Catch-22 where without them people will not meet, but the people have to meet in order to agree on conditions for meeting.

The invitation from a social science researcher to participate in a workshop allows both sides a way out of the dilemma. Neither side has to appear so eager to participate as to have initiated contact. Such initiation may seem a sign of weakness of resolve. The prior conditions are those set by the researcher - workshop organizer for his supposedly technical purposes and not set by either side. Furthermore, a party may respond not so much from a belief in the efficacy of the method nor from a desire to resolve the conflict, as from the desire to gain approval from the third party or to seem, in general, reasonable and conciliating. Participation may begin as a low commitment act. The problem for the workshop approach is how such a low commitment act can have important conflict resolution consequences.

The Uses of the Workshop

As suggested, the workshop may provide a unique locus of contact in severe conflicts where equal status contact has been systematically prevented for strong ideological or tactical reasons. It has, however, a variety of additional purposes.

The originators of the workshop approach were John Burton and his associates at the Center for the Analysis of Conflict at University College, London, and Leonard Doob and his associates at Yale University. Their conceptions will be discussed first.

Burton's description of what he calls "controlled communication" is very ambitious at times. He thinks of controlled communication as capable of being an alternative to the usual form of diplomatic negotiation.

Arguing that diplomatic negotiation is based on the concept of compromise, Burton instead proposes that each side must reassess its values and priorities through controlled communication. If it does so, it will change its behavior in the conflict not by compromise but by adopting a mode of behavior more truly consistent with its own values. Burton prefers to have the highest level decision-makers possible as part of the workshop, because they can quickly put into practice the new insights. Since the participants must be able to adopt the analytic attitude toward the conflict which is central to Burton's approach, many decision-makers may not be suitable for a Burton workshop.

The workshop may not be an alternative to negotiation so much as a valuable prelude to formal diplomatic contact. Both sides can feel each other out for points of unofficial flexibility and for readiness to engage in negotiation itself. Neither side has to initiate negotiation, both sides can float trial balloons with relative impunity, and personal contacts can be made that may later be useful in the process of negotiation itself. It could be an important resource to have some representatives on each side, who have some trust in each other coming into negotiations.

2) Doob concentrates not on value reassessment but on change in the personal opinions and attitudes of the participants towards the goal of their producing an agreement between them. The outcome should be a combination of two separate goals:

a) the discovery of new solutions to the issues of the conflict;
b) the change of the attitudes and opinions of a significant group of people in each of the conflicting parties.

Again, it should be said that the kind of participants who might produce innovations are not the same sort who might best be able to communicate these innovations to the descision-making elite of their respective parties.

Workshops so far have been undertaken with one set of participants with one set of techniques. Therefore the idea of a series of workshop maximizing different goals with different participants but all feeding into the resolution of a particular conflict has not been attempted.

3) A further possible goal of a workshop would be to produce an analytic understanding of the conflict itself, its issues and problems, with little initial emphasis on attempting to find agreement or change attitudes. This would be appropriate for preliminary exploratory workshops as our own were. Such a workshop also establishes a natural link to the educational process and requires even less commitment to a peaceful resolution of the conflict on the part of participants. Specific elements of a conflict may be subject to scrutiny, or specific theoretical questions may be studied. For example:

a) the role of personal suffering in political attitudes;
b) the pattern of stereotypes of each other's position, is it always mirror-image?:
c) symbols of flexibility and intransigeance that are recognized mutually or only by one side;
d) identifying central and peripheral aspects of the conflict;
e) real preference for peaceful solution vs. unilateral force solution.

Finally, the workshop may be used to deal with the problem of developing a communication apparatus for the groups in conflict and finding mutually acceptable ways of pursuing further discussions.

In summary, the workshop approach has been seen as an alternative form of negotiation, an adjunct or preparation for negotiation, an exercise in discovering new options for conflict resolution, an attempt to change the attitudes and opinions of a specific part of a national elite (or non-elite), or as a method of studying either the process of conflict in general or a specific conflict of interest. Furthermore, these various goals may be combined in a series of workshops coordinated around the attempt to help resolve a particular conflict.

The Design of the Workshops

The workshops described here were conducted as part of a seminar on Social Psychological Aspects of International Relations. The workshop organizers were the seminar leaders. The students in the seminar and experts on the particular conflicts were consulted in the planning and execution of the workshops.

The first workshop, led by Herbert Kelman and the author, was focused on the Arab-Israeli conflicts; the second workshop, led by the author, was focused on the India-Pakistan-Bangladesh conflicts.

Pre-Planning: the Definition of the Conflict

The students in the seminar were given the option of choosing the conflict they wished to study. The purpose of the workshop, in the context of the seminar, was a culmination of the educational process of the seminar and an attempt to examine the new method (the international conflict resolution workshop) in a very modest way.

The workshop would be held over a long weekend and the participants would be the most readily accessible nationals of the particular groups chosen.

(When the Arab-Israeli conflict was chosen, it was with some initial reluctance on the part of the organizers. Both are Jewish and this seemed an impediment to legitimation as third-party interveners. This problem proved to be difficult but not intractable as the recruitment and workshop itself proceeded. An Arab expert on the conflict was brought in to the process, among other things.)

One of the central elements in the pre-planning phase in both workshops was the definition of the parties. Each side in the Middle East conflict has its own preferred definition of the nature of the conflict and therefore its central parties. It became clear that a definition of the conflict as involving Arabs and Israelis was both too imprecise and too loaded in its political connotations. There was a question of how to define the Arab side. Some felt that the Arabs could be one party with elements chosen from different Arab groups; Egyptians, Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians, Lebanese and so on. Others felt that the most important focus for intervention should be the Palestinian-Israeli aspect of the conflict. Arguments could also be made for the importance of representatives of the great powers since they have so decisive an influence on regional outcomes.

The decision was made to have three separate parties, one Palestinians, one Egyptian, and one Israeli. Each of the three would be of equal size so that in the workshop itself there would be only four Israelis to the eight Arabs, four Palestinians, four Egyptians. This decision was critical to the kinds of issues we intended to explore and the kind of workshop we eventually had.

Furthermore, we recruited only a certain sub-set of each of these groups. A decision was made to recruit available students of each of these groups for reasons of convenience for use and because of the interest student's might have in participating in a seminar project. Furthermore we desired to underplay our effort since it was preliminary and would be of such short duration. The Bangladesh-Pakistan-India workshop used a similar method of initial contacts choosing randomly from lists of foreign nationals at various campuses in the area.

These initial decisions as to the definition of parties and method of recruitment had critical consequences. It left for our contact persons, the decision of what to do with such groups as Arab citizens of Israel, Moslem citizens of India , and Bengalis in India. It also meant that we had less control over the political distribution of the participants which resulted in a bunching around the official positions of almost all the groups involved. Furthermore, each participant had more of a sense of himself as representative of his group as a whole than if he or she had been individually chosen or chosen as a representative of a sub-group within each national group. One can imagine purposes for which such procedures may be inappropriate. For example, if one wished to minimize a sense of group unity and solidarity choosing people as representing sub-group interests would be a more effective method.

Recruitment Process

Recruitment in the Egyptian-Israeli workshop, and to a lesser extent in the Bangladesh-Pakistan-India workshop, proved itself to be a source of valuable information about the operation of each party.

The individual Palestinians recruited sought legitimacy for participation by the desire to include high status Palestinians. When the Israelis saw this they attempted also to recruit further up in their hierarchy. However, for the Palestinians the hierarchy was an official political hierarchy, whereas the Israelis searched out academic experts on the Middle East conflict and avoided any recruitment in official circles. The Pakistanis sought governmental approval. The Bengalis indicated that status among them derived from proximity in Bangladesh to the massacres. The Pakistanis recruited most actively people who had undergone great personal suffering from the conflict. The Indians, like the Israelis, looked for more established persons. The Indians, in addition to looking for high academic status persons, looked as well for persons in business and other non-academic places.

The participants in the end came, in part, from persons with higher group status than had been originally intended. This meant that the workshops would be less likely to contain highly flexible people whose positions diverged greatly from that which was the group standard. However, the process gave the workshops an air of importance (though temporary) and an atmosphere of tension that they otherwise might well have lacked.

Pre-Workshop Sessions

A unique element of the design of these two workshops was the institution of pre-workshop meetings of each of the parties with the organizers in the absence of the other parties.

The induction of participants out of a blaming mentality when they believe deeply in the justice of their own cause is not an easy task. It seemed likely that each party would want an opportunity to present its own case as forcefully as possible. Once such a presentation was made, the other side would feel obliged to refute it. And so the rhetoric would escalate, leaving far behind the possibility of more effective communication without endless blame attribution.

It seemed best to allow each side to give vent to its full version of the conflict to the workshop organizers. Since there is a motive to convince the third-party of the justice of one's cause, this would provide an opportunity for full expression of one's case outside of the workshop in a way that would be less disruptive of the workshop itself. Furthermore, it would allow the organizers to get a less sanitized view of each side's point of view, less effected by the style of presentation utilized by the other side in the conflict and less tactically determined.

The second reason for these pre-session workshops was to develop some within-party solidarity. The Doob method has attempted to work with participants as individuals. Since the goal in the present workshops was to maximize learning about the conflict and to conceptualize the workshops in inter-party terms, some interaction within each party was highly desirable. Furthermore, the heightened realism of the workshop as a meeting between conflicting parties reflected a strong tendency towards workshop techniques that centered around conflict issues rather than personal issues of trust. If we were to create trust it had to be political trust between parties not simply individual trust between persons (though the latter may feed into the former).

It would be interesting to know how much intra-party interaction takes place as private caucusing when there is no procedure like the one followed here. It might well be that the kind of intra-group structuring, leadership development, and careful feeling out of each other that took place in the

pre-workshop sessions instead takes place unobserved and privately. Or it may be that the emphasis on the group created by the pre-workshop session further increases the need for such outside meetings between party members in the interests of coordination and solidarity.

Third, the pre-workshop sessions with each party provided an opportunity for comparison of statements and behavioral patterns in the presence of a third party alone with such behavior in the presence of both,or third party and the opposing party. Such comparisons would be themselves an indicator of the frankness of discussion with the other side and the particular dynamics of face-to-face interaction between the two groups. A follow-up session with each party separately would then also provide a measure of internalized change of views, as opposed to new positions taken in face-to-face contact for solely tacticaly reasons.

The individual pre-workshop sessions usually consisted of a four hour evening discussion including dinner. Each party knew that the others would have similar sessions but there was no quoting from the other party's sessions and it was understood that the organizers would not repeat what was said in this "private" session to the other side in the workshop proper. In this way a strategy not to raise certain points or to concede other points might be adopted without fear of contradiction from pre-workshop statements. For example, in the pre-workshop sessions, the Indians conceded the justice of the Pakistani claim to Kashmir but vigorously defended the official Indian position in the presence of the Pakistanis. Such contradictions would be an important subject for discussion in a post-workshop session with each party separately.

The pre-workshop sessions focused on each side's view of the conflict, its genesis, the reasons for its continuation and the possible solutions to it. The following were some of the areas explored in the session:

1) What is the central issues of the conflict?;
2) Who are the main parties to the conflict and who are the peripheral parties?;
3) What did they believe was the other side's view of the conflict?;

4) What benefit does each side derive from the perpetuation of the conflict?;
5) What benefits would each side derive from the resolution of the conflict?;
6) What costs does each side incur as a result of the conflict and its perpetuation?

(Note here that we did not make an assumption that each side wanted conflict resolution or, later, that the result of a workshop would be greater agreement. We tried to bring out any indications of desire to perpetuate the conflict, or even escalate it.

In the discussion of costs and benefits of each side an attempt was made to focus on both national issues and sub-group issues. That is, there may be some benefits of conflict resolution that everyone will reap and there may be other benefits that one segment of the society would reap and not others.

The idea behind this series of questions was to get a sense of the complexity of perspective each side had about itself and the other side and to initiate an analytic method of looking at both sides in the conflict.)

7) What are the key goals and national priorities of each group? How were they impeded or advanced by the conflict? (Here each side tended to see the other as fanning the flames of conflict for the purpose of national unity and maintaining or creating a strong centralized authority.)
8) What are all the major possible solutions to the conflict?
9) Which did each member most prefer and why? Which was most preferred by the whole national group and why?
10) Which solution was most hateful to the party in question?
11) What differences within each national group existed about solutions?
12) Which solution did the other side prefer most and why?

(Questions 7 through 12 focused on the idea of alternative futures emphasizing solutions to the conflict rather than its origin. Again one could gauge how well each side understood the motivations of its antagonist and its own internal division or unity on outcomes. Typically, the most preferred solution

may be consensual and unanimous but the second most preferred will already indicate the implicit nuances of differences in the self-picture of each side.)

13) What was the personal experience each participant had of the conflict? How did the conflict impinge on the lives of the participants?;

14) What specific steps could they imagine their own national group taking toward peace or conflict resolution?;

15) What specific actions could they imagine of the other side that would be significant (though limited) steps toward conflict resolution?

(While questions 7 through 12 emphasized long range solutions, questions 14 and 15 focus on small steps to resolution that are conceivable in the short run. Middle range interim solutions emerged in the long range solutions discussions.)

The workshop organizers played a number of roles in these pre-workshop sessions. First, they asked these questions and followed up on them trying to solicit views from each of the participants. Internal disagreements were gently probed, as many of the questions lent themselves to a spectrum of views. Second, notes were taken, with the consent of the participants, for internal communication among the workshop organizers. Finally, a few introductory process comments were made.

The format of interventions by the workshop organizers was designed to go beyond general chairing of the meeting and questioning. It was hoped that group process interventions would be a useful technique for penetrating the usual blaming approaches and for going beyond the cliches about the conflict.

However the process comments were not directed either at the behavior of the individuals per se or even their specific interaction patterns and communication blockages.

Rather the goal was to relate the observed interaction to possible parallels at the macro-level of the conflict itself. In the pre-workshop session such interventions were used in two primary ways:

1) The attitudes and values of the participants in the workshop, the way of dealing with the claims of the other side, internal divisions and so on were projected onto the national level. To what extent did perceptions

expressed or revealed in the pre-workshop session reflect a within-nation cultural consensus about the adversary?

2) Attitudes expressed or explanations offered in describing the conflict might sometimes be elucidated by specific reference to an analytic concept or social scientific generalization. For example, attributions of aggressive aims to the adversary alone could be further explored by reference to mirror-image notions. The participants' view of the relationship between personal suffering from the conflict and political perspective could be related to relative deprivation notions or the frustration-aggression hypotheses. This use of higher order generalization can be a technique for encouraging appropriate comparison and contrast within an access group without challenging a national the uniqueness of the individual's or nation's experience. This process-specific use of theoretical notions is distinguished from Burton's use in that it is tied to specific interaction observed in the workshop and not introduced independently. (In the workshop itself the independent use of theoretical materials was also attempted.)

Of course, the more directive method of questioning used in the pre-workshop meetings (but not in the workshop sessions) also indicated theoretical positions about significant cognitive frameworks for conflict resolution. The emphasis on assessing the national costs of conflict in relationship to the national values; the emphasis on accurate perception of the other side and seeing the conflict from the perspective of the adversary; the importance of pointing to the relationship between internal conflict and external conflict; all are reflected in the questions prepared for use.

Finally, an attempt was made to adapt Roger Fisher's notion of conflict fractionation to face-to-face contact. One reason for the log-jam of protracted conflicts is the deep commitment to long range goals without attention to the process of reaching these goals and interim steps toward these goals. Conflicts may differ in the usefulness of this technique, but it does allow for examination of symbolic acts of reconciliation, in the absence of, or in preparation for, concrete political changes.

The Structure of the Workshop

The workshops took place at Harvard University. The main workshop sessions took place in a room with an oval table. The room was equipped with recording devices and a one-way mirror, but neither were used by mutual consent of organizers and particiapnts.

Lunch and supper were eaten together but sleeping quarters were not organized for all participants. Those who lived in the area went home to sleep and so the advantages and disadvantages of intense interaction in isolation were not present. However informal interaction was possible at coffee breaks and mealtimes and at an informal gathering at the home of one of the organizers during one evening. The workshops began on a Friday and ended before dinner on Sunday, so they were considerably shorter than those conducted by Doob and Burton.

The seating arrangement began with initially assigned areas for each party and for the organizers. In both workshops the participants voluntarily maintained the same seating arrangement throughout, changing only within-party seating. Since the middle east workshop had become a Palestinian-Israeli workshop, the Egyptians having withdrawn for reasons to be described below, it was decided that it was best that they not sit directly opposite each other around the oval table. In the triparty workshop the Indians and Pakistanis faced each other on the short ends of the table, while the Bengalis faced the workshop organizers across the long end and were thus, so to speak, sandwiched between the Pakistanis and Indians.

Each workshop began with a general introduction to the purpose of the workshop which was defined as "effective communication". It was stressed that having a clearer view of the other side's position might not lead to reconciliation, since distortion of perception could be benign and accurate perception more hostile. Participants were encouraged to use the opportunity to explore new ideas, and to not feel committed to every hypothetical idea they presented. Confidentiality was stressed, and it was agreed that the identities of the participants would

under no circumstances be revealed by the workshop organizers. In the case of the Israeli-Palestinian workshop, it was agreed that any detailed account of the workshop would be cleared with the participants but that generalizations and comments on technique were open for discussion. The participants in the other workshop waived this right at the end of the workshop leaving detailed description up to the discretion of the organizers.

The first session was planned in advance in each case as a discussion of theories of nationalism. Since the question of national identity and national liberation had emerged in the pre-workshop sessions as central to the conflict in each case, it was thought that theory of nationalism would be an appropriate topic in introducing an analytic approach to the specific conflicts at hand.

Neither other specific topics for theoretical discussion nor other planned exercises were scheduled in advance. No specific goal was set. In fact it was explicitly stated that no written signed document was expected or desirable as a result of the workshop. It was hoped that this would allow for more free-flowing discussion and less self-censorship on the part of workshop participants.

Instead of a planned schedule, a set of exercises and methods of intervention were prepared in advance for ready use if and when they seemed valuable in terms of the workshop. In addition, specific workshop organizers were assigned responsibility for process interventions. Following upon the technique used in the pre-workshop sessions, process comments were directed not at individual behavior per se but at the ways in which the process of interaction in the group itself might reflect aspects of interaction between the parties in the world of their conflict.

This type of intervention was able to bring out significant aspects of the workshops for discussion. For example, the Bengalis, it was pointed out, never addressed disagreement to the Indians but also would consistently resist being called upon for agreement on certain key issues. When the pattern was described, a discussion ensued about the mutual fears of Bengalis and

Indians. The Indians were concerned that the Bengalis not become too enthusiastic about the concept of Bengali nationalism and the unity of all Bengalis, whatever their religion. The Bengalis had real hopes that the Bengalis living in India in West Bengal would eventually wish to secede from India to join Bangla Desh.

Two other examples of such interventions at the process level may help to provide some of the flavor of the workshop interaction, as well as the method of intervention itself.

At several points in the Palestinian-Israeli workshop, the Israeli participants offered help and advice to the Palestinians. The Israelis suggested that they could help in the conceptualization of the political organization strategies for the Palestinian movements. At another point the Palestinians expressed their hostility at King Hussein of Jordan. One Israeli flippantly offered to have the Israelis "knock him off" on behalf of the Palestinians. Whenever the Israelis did this, the Palestinians reacted angrily, rather than gratefully, as the Israelis seemed to expect. The "knocking off" of Hussein did not bring collective laughter but a mixture of stony silence and scowling. The Israelis were somewhat baffled by this response and continued what they thought were these gestures of conciliation.

The workshop organizers pointed out that this advice giving could not be perceived as an act of conciliation because in the context of the present power balance such help offers implied condescension, and a reminder, or signalling, that Israel had the power or experience to accomplish what the Palestinians could not easily do at this moment themselves. To have accepted the offers would have been to accept the Israeli definition of the situation, and to accept the help of one's enemy would be to accept his status. The Israelis did not see themselves as the real enemies of the Palestinians and part of the workshop learning was in the learning of the reality of the enmity and its depth.

It was the point of this intervention to examine whether this pattern of interaction might not operate at the international level as well, in the real arena of conflict. Helping, it was hypothesized, could not be a conciliatory mode of interaction in the context of power differentials and hostility as existed in this case. Without pushing the analogy too far we could examine how much the contrasting perceptions would explain Israeli West Bank policy and the response to it.

In the same workshop, the Palestinians often made directly disparaging remarks about Israeli militarism and illegitimacy. The Israelis countered these arguments firmly, but in an even-tempered way, as if such attacks were to be expected. At one point, one of the Palestinians told a joke with a typical anti-Jewish ring: the punch line was about Jewish greed for money and cunning in acquiring it. At this remark the Israelis balked and became furious. For the only time in this tense and heated workshop, the Israelis threatened to walk out if such jokes were to be heard again.

It was observed how this element of Israeli identity, the Jewish element, aroused the greatest sensitivity on the part of the Israelis. The Palestinian who made this joke had either been unaware of the sensitivity of this element or had unerringly seized the jugular vein of Israelis sensitivities.

The process interpretive style of intervention was accompanied by interventions about content issues as well. The workshop chairmen carefully avoided any adjudication of factual or historical claims. However, occasionally it seemed valuable to point to contradictions in the reality perceptions of each side, or within each party, of the meaning attributed by each side to the same event. For example, the Egyptians, in the pre-workshop session, emphasized the centrality of the Palestinian issue in the genesis of the Arab-Israeli conflict, but downplayed its significance in discussing solutions. The discrepancy when mentioned led to a revealing discussion of the complexity of the Egyptian-Arab dimensions of the Egyptian identity.

Exercise of a more structured kind were utilized not by fixed schedule but as a form of intervention in themselves. In other words, a set of such exercises were designed in advance, to be used as was seen fit by organizers and by workshop participants at particular junctures in the workshop. No workshop exercise was undertaken without the full prior consent of the parties, as a result some of the instances when the organizers would have liked to use a particular exercise passed without such use. Using a structured form of interaction seems very game-like at times to the parties and it is perceived as demeaning to the seriousness of the issue to employ such techniques. Furthermore they may be looked on as part of an experiment rather than as aids to conflict resolution itself. In these

workshops, whatever their difficulties, the participants were very serious and did not have a gamelike attitude toward the workshop.

The exercises that were planned in advance for one or both of the workshops are listed below, with some discussion as to their application in use.

1) Reconstituted Groups of Two and Two

Burton's discussion of controlled communication and many other theoretical treatments of intellectual conflict dwell upon internal cleavages within societies as both cause and effect of external conflict. To explore the possibility of internal cleavages, the pre-workshop sessions were looked at carefully for evidence of within-party division. Also, in some cases, a particular group member was shifting the whole party to an extreme position and it was important to see whether conflict would be resolved in the absence of this person.

Furthermore in both conflicts studied there were a number of classicial solutions, long-debated, which were proposed in the pre-workshop sessions. Therefore, it was proposed that the parties be broken down into groups with two from each party to discuss the implication of living with one of the proposed solutions. For example, one Palestinian-Israeli group might discuss the way of life in a partitioned settlement with a separate Palestinian state and a separate Israeli state, and another group might discuss life in a binational regime.

It was thought that it might be possible to do this also with specific issues like the Kashmir problem where the groups might work out different specific solutions.

This was not used, as groups in both workshops felt strongly that this was a divisive tactic that they could not tolerate. Their strong antipathy to this idea is one of many pieces of evidence of the over-riding importance of within-group solidarity maintenance within these conflicting groups, especially those groups in subordinate positions in the power hierarchy.

2) Separate Meetings as Parties.

During the workshop itself members of each party will look for opportunities to talk with each other about the way the party is representing itself, its strategy, and the performance of particular individuals. Such discussions which may or may not develop into full-scale caucusing can have an important effect on the participants in bringing about conformity to a certain line of approach, or in bringing a deviant into line, or in adopting a collective attitude toward some issue that has become salient in the context of the workshop.

Such conversations or caucuses are unlikely to be in the presence of the organizers and they may be only to discover the contexts of such discussions by their later consequences. In workshop approaches where the goal is to maximize immediate change, such discussions may be detrimental to the goal and so an attempt may be made to minimize the opportunity for such discussion. In the approach presented here, such within party processes are deemed to be a necessary part of the workshop if it is to bear a close relationship to the conflict's realities and if change within the workshop is to have any real chance of transfer beyond the workshop itself. Given this approach it was thought that providing explicit opportunity for such within-party caucusing in the workshop would provide the possibility of observing these internal processes and measuring their effects. Not that one would assume that no additional more secretive meetings would be obviated by this procedure, but simply to see what new elements of intra-party interaction have developed since the pre-workshop session as a result of the contact with the opponent party. Having such sessions enhances the reality of the party as the unit of interaction. For approaches which prefer to treat each individual outside the context of his or her national group this would not be desirable. It was the view here that international conflict resolution involved the individuals as nationals and that therefore the lasting changes had to be at this collective level. The changed individual must know how to convey the logic of his altered views to fellow nationals without either losing belief in the new perceptions, or losing credibility with the fellow nationals with whom contact is made and the results of the workshop discussed.

In the caucus environment, the first test of transfer of training is made. The internal language of the group may be used, and particularistic arguments that might not be made in the presence of the other side can be made in the present

context. Interpersonal bonds may have developed in the workshop across national lines: such a caucus gives the first indication as to whether such bonds have political consequences.

In the short workshops actually conducted, such caucuses took place without the guidance of the organizers. The native language was heard as emotional discussions took place in hallways or corners of rooms. In the Israeli-Palestinian case it was not possible to get agreement to have formal caucuses attended by workshop organizers. In the South Asia workshop, such a caucus was conducted openly in the presence of the organizers. It was particularly noteworthy in the case of the Bengali participants that the opportunity was used to chastise a deviant for being too conciliatory and that such criticism took place in the native language. In all cases it was a chance to see how internal references shed light on later actions by the participants as evidence of group loyalty.

3) Theoretical Discussions

Following the Burton model of controlled communication, it was planned that theories from the social and behavioral sciences relating to international relations, conflict, and conflict resolution would be introduced for discussion. The purpose was to move the focus of attention away from the blaming approach to a more analytical approach to conflict.

It was determined that as a result of the pre-workshop seesions that the theory of nationalism was especially relevant to the issues in dispute in the conflicts studied. At the beginning of each workshop a general theory of nationalism was presented for discussion to the participants. At a later stage some comparative aspects of binational states were introduced especially with reference to the Belgian example. Other possiblities that were entertained but not in the end utilized included models of escalation and deescalation of conflict, and discussion of the causes of war and the patterns of ending wars.

The nationalism discussions were very fruitful in bringing out very real concerns each of the parties had both about their own identity and that of their antagonists. The relation between religion, territory, language, culture and history were the source of lively and profound controversy in both workshops. On the other hand, the material on binationalism was dismissed by both Palestinians and Israelis in that workshop where it was introduced.

4) Informal Interaction and Its Monitoring

The opportunity that a workshop provides participants for face-to-face interaction with nationals of the opposing group is a major incentive for participation and is itself work encouraging. In the context of a workshop such informal interaction may also serve as an important window on the developing attitudes in the workshop.

The workshop participants are likely to have as a motive the desire to convince the organizers of the justice of their case. The participants may also wish to explore the personal views of the organizers to ascertain their biases in the running of the workshop. The personal contact may not allay suspicion but at least it allows the organizers to see what suspicions exist. Most of all it allows the nationals to pursue privately aspects of the discussion that would be too risky to discuss publicly before some feelers are sent out.

In the Palestinian-Israeli workshop, the informal setting provided by meals and coffee breaks allowed interaction in Hebrew between some Israelis and those Palestinians who knew Hebrew. This bond helped to alleviate tensions at a later stage in the workshop itself, though it was the subject of some intra-party discomfort.

Some of the Bengalis refused to interact in a friendly manner with the Pakistanis even in the informal setting. This was a good indicator of the level of their hostility. In the end, overtures by Pakistanis for informal conversation were accepted by only one of the Bengalis, noticeably the one who had least personal experience of war time atrocities.

The informal setting offers the possibility of humanizing the perception of all workshop participants. Non-political common ground can be discovered which though not directly leading to political moderation, may lead to a less blaming-like approach to discussion of political issues and a less conspiratorial view of the other side. Such interaction can be seen by the organizers, but if they do more than observe it unobtrusively, they may deprive the situation of the informality and non-official nature that gives it its significance. In the present case no attempt was made to intrude even slightly on the setting, so that no recording or note taking was undertaken during this period.

5) Role Reversal

Counterattitudinal advocacy is a powerful technique of attitude change. However, it is exceedingly difficult to induce participants to speak for the abhorred views of the adversary in their presence. For many participants such a technique, even in a game, would be morally reprehensible.

The usefulness of role reversal for the present purpose is not so much as an attitude change technique, since that was not the primary goal of the workshop. Rather role reversal generates new ideas about the conflict and may clarify each side's perception of the enemy's worldview.

Role reversal, based on the experiences of these two workshops, is not a technique that can be easily used in the presence of the other abhorred or feared side. However, it can be approximated in the pre-workshop sessions, and perhaps in caucus sessions as well. Trying to elicit from a party its perception of the other side's way of thinking is not objectionable as it involves the kind of strategic second guessing that is engaged in frequently.

Role reversal in the presence of the other side may be possible in a longer workshop after considerable trust has developed, or in a workshop where participants have explicitly agreed beforehand to such exercises. Our own experience would not suggest it as a preferred method of intervention.

6) Communication "Telephone"

Communication between hostile parties especially when there is a noticeable cultural difference may itself contribute to the maintenance of conflict and the difficulty in finding a mutually acceptable symbolic system for conflict reduction. Communication telephone is one technique for exposing and exploring such difficulties. It involves the transfer of messages back and forth between the conflicting parties to see what elements of distortion enter into the process. Such a technique is likely to be perceived as too gimmicky by the participants in such workshops and the suggestion may enhance the sense of experimentation that can be detrimental to the workshop. Participants rightly take the conflict too seriously to be manipulated by what can be perceived as irrelevant games.

The desire of the participants to remain on the political plane was too intense for us to have suggested such a method of intervention. Furthermore, there were many naturally occurring instances of communication difficulties of this kind so that the point could be made without resort to a special exercise. The experience of these two workshops suggest great caution in the adoption of techniques that arise out of the various intensive T-group or encounter group settings. There is a tendency for such interventions to be seen as condescending on the part of the social scientist in the context of international conflict where the expectations are very different than in the American cultural context of individual change technology and methodology.

Both role reversal and communication telephone are designed to point to the difficulties in taking the role of the other, or accurately perceiving the other when the other is despised or feared, or generally seen as the enemy. Some workshop leaders may find it interesting to compare communication breakdowns when communication material is conflict relevent with communication when the material is conflict irrelevant. This may help to distinguish between language fluency problems, cultural distance, and conflict distortion. The general preference would be however to find such instances in the natural flow of communication in the workshop discussions.

7) Conflict Fractionation Exercises

The usefulness of a workshop may come to rest on its ability to produce some concrete suggestions for conflict resolution, if not some areas of actual agreement. Producing such products may not be the primary goal of a workshop, but even so the process may demand some sense of accomplishment in concrete terms. The temptation is to search for comprehensive agreement on the main issues of the conflict, even to draft a quasi-peace treaty.

The discussion of comprehensive proposals may be an important element in a workshop but focusing on such solutions as an end product can often run the twin risks of reaching an impasse where no agreement is possible or reaching such a general level of agreement as to leave no idea as to how to reach the stage of agreement in the real political context. Even a detailed general agreement runs

the risk of having little real support because the process that led to the agreement is not available as evidence of trust to non-workshop participants.

The technique adopted here was to focus not only on the long range ultimate solutions to the conflict but on small concrete steps that could be taken to improve the environment for settlement and which steps would be perceived as indicating a renewed desire for resolution by peaceful means.

As practiced in the India Bangladesh-Pakistan workshop, the method proceeds as follows:

a) Each party met separately with the task of formulating some decision or action that the other side should take which would be seen as a small but noteworthy step toward reconciliation. Each party was also to formulate one large scale action that would be perceived as a major step toward reconciliation.

b) Each party, still meeting alone, was to formulate a step it would be willing to take in order to induce the other side to take that step that it felt would be helpful, or that it would be willing to take as a positive response to the other side's step. (The difference between initiation and response was of course to be explored later.) This was to be repeated for the large step.

c) When each side had completed the operation and believed at least for the small step that there was some reasonable chance that the other side would agree, the two sides met and exchanged their proposals.

d) At this stage either discussion could take place in joint sessions about the proposals or a continuation of the separate party meeting could take place.

The Israeli-Palestinian workshop never evolved to the point where this level of concreteness was possible. The whole of the workshop turned on a declaration that the Israeli participants would make. The India-Pakistan-Bangladesh workshop provided its greatest insights precisely in these decision making sessions that came close to the end of the workshop.

One of the most important "finding" from the workshop emerged from the contrast of the various separate party meetings. It became clear that the mirror image notion of conflict derived from the Soviet-American conflict does not apply to these conflicts. To be precise, the intractibility of these conflicts consists in precisely the fact that each does not see the other as its main protagonist.

For the Indian the most significant antagonist is China. For the Bengali, Pakistan. For the Pakistani the the significant other is the Indian, The Indian does not see the Pakistani as the most significant other, but the Pakistani, as we have already said see the Indian in that role, not the Bengali.

In the intra-party sessions, the Indians worked for several hours and were unable to formulate anything that they wanted from the Pakistanis. And if they wanted nothing from them why should they give anything? At the end trying hard to fulfill the task they agreed on the prompting of a strongly pro-Indian Polish communist organizer of the workshop to ask for peaceful coexistence and cultural exchange. At the same time the Pakistanis spent their time in intense discussion of the many demands they had and the difficult choice of choosing one or two. They spent all their time on the Indians and no time at all thinking about the Bengalis, who in turn spent all of their time thinking about the Pakistanis. When they returned to the workshop central room they discovered how fundamentally asymetrical their real concerns were in relation to each other.

The Bengalis had listed among their steps from Pakistan the issue of war crime trials and the removal of certain especially notorious Pakistani leaders. The Pakistanis were at first quite surprised that this, rather than a more tangible demand, was being made. Slowly one of the Pakistanis formulated a proposal as partial agreement to the Bengali demand. One Bengali who had witnessed the loss of much of his family at Pakistani hands just months before and who had passed the workshop without so much as a glance in the direction of the Pakistanis, looked at this Pakistani in the eye and said, "Thank you," under his breath, but loud enough to silence all present for a long and powerful moment.

(The solution that emerged approximated the one achieved in lengthy negotiations between the two governments two years later.)

The concrete experience helped to clarify the problems of asymmetry which was central to this three-way conflict. It is interesting to note that when the Israelis talked in the pre-workshop session about their preferred steps toward peace, it was clear that these were steps that Egypt could taken, not the Palestinians, while the Palestinians expressed their direct demands from the Israelis. It is possible that leverage for conflict resolution exists only when the focus can be narrowed to symmetrical concerns and when there is enough mutual need for concessions to make such a process possible.

8) Transfer of Training Sessions

The most recalcitrant problem facing interventions of the workshop type is that they will bring about changes in the context of the experience itself but that these changes will not stand the test of time. This problem for the workshop is a specific example of the problem of transfer of training.

The international conflict resolution workshop has this problem in a number of ways. The persons in the workshop may change their attitudes for tactical purposes alone and not have any intention of retaining these changes in attitude over an extended period of time. More likely still is the possibility that the pressure of friends and associates in the home environment may push the individual back to previously held views. Even if a person maintains the views that were instilled in the workshop session there is no certainty that this will prove a positive force for societal change. If the views are perceived as too dangerous, the advocate of them may simply find it impossible to operate in the bureaucratic context, or to maintain the government or intellectual position previously held.

When the goal is to generate new ideas rather than to foster individual attitude change, the problem is also clear: how can the ideas generated in the workshop receive appropriate hearing in decision-making circles, or how can these ideas gain support in some sub-groups within the society.

In both workshops, sessions were set aside specifically for review of what had been learned and for attempts to design application of what had been learned to the conflict setting. In the India-Pakistan-Bangladesh workshop these oral evaluations were supplemented by individual written statements.

In the latter case, also some quantitative data were gathered in an attempt to measure the participant's perceptions of what had changed in the context of the workshop. Specifically, social distance scales were used to ascertain whether the participants estimated that the distance between the various parties had grown or lessened in their understanding as a result of the workshop. The social distance scale was designed to measure changes in the perception of the level of hostility

between the nations in the conflict, not changes in one's own attitude toward the other side. (The purpose was to see whether participants had come to view the other side as more or less far apart from them as a result of the new knowledge gained in the workshop.) Items were included to compare the intensity of the conflict as perceived by participants with the intensity of other conflicts.

The results though based on small samples were revealing. The Bengalis without exception viewed their distance from the Indians as small but growing, while the Indians viewed it as very small and getting still smaller. Only the Bengalis viewed their distance from the Pakistanis as even greater than the distance between Arab and Israeli which in turned was viewed as much greater than the distance between the United States and the Soviet Union. These conflicts were included as baseline comparison measures.

The discussion of implementation of change was clearly inadequate in these workshops. For one thing, the strategizing must take place within groups so as to act jointly and there was not within group opportunity. A technique for enhancing the transfer possibilities would be to bring at the end of the workshop nationals who had not participated and to conduct a short workshop between these nationals and those that had participated. In this context they would try to formulate the insights gained and work out a strategy for influencing their own group to take the new ideas more seriously. If this is done within the workshop context there may be more chance that the information will be passed without a heavy overlay of self-protective scepticism. One can be relatively certain that if the workshop has serious outcomes such debriefings will anyways take place and so it would be well to structure such debriefings in such a way as to maximize the possibility of positive transfer.

Workshop Behavior vs. Pre-workshop Session Behavior: Power and Solidarity

When people were brought together with these careful methods of intervention did they become more peace loving? When people with a painful history of mutual enmity come together what emerges as the real source of their conflict?

Any answer to such complex and profound questions can only be a tentative set of hypotheses. The next two sections are very tentative suggestions about these issues. In this section the workshops will be looked at for evidence of the internal and between group processes that are involved in conciliation and escalation. In the next section it will be proposed that one of the areas for most intense and difficult negotiation is the definition of national identity and the concept of negotiation of identity will be introduced as a window to understanding the issues in long term conflcits of the kind here studied.

The pre-workshop session takes plaoe without the presence of the opposing party or parties. As such it forms one convenient base line of comparison for workshop behavior. Does each group differ in predictable ways from the context of talking with the organizers alone to talking with the enemy as well?

The pre-workshop session had been instituted for a number of reasons, described above. Primarily we hoped that the opportunity would be used to ventilate one's own view of the conflict. We anticipated that the participants would use the opportunity to convince the organizers of the justice of their cause. This assumption would lead to a prediction of greater hostility in the pre-workshop sessions than in the workshop itself. On the other hand, one could argue that it is much easier to be conciliatory in the absence of the enemy, in more private discussions. The presence of the other side could elicit the deepr feelings of anger and make one less willing to concede any ground at all.

The question of conciliation is tied up with another interesting aspect of within group processes: leadership and the tolerance of internal dissent. Is there any pattern to the growth of leadership in such inter group interaction? How much dissent can be tolerated in the face of the enemy?

It should be stressed that the use of the pre-workshop session as a baseline is by no means the same as the use of a baseline of within-group interaction in the absence of the organizers as well. However such a baseline could not be obtained in a strictly comparable way. In more elaborate designs free discussion prior to meeting with the organizers might be measured (of course with the consent of the participants) or measures of indigenous cultural materials might be gathered.

1) Conciliatory vs. tough-minded attitudes

The first indication of the special nature of the pre-workshop session came from the Egyptians. They indicated in this session a conciliatory approach to many of their differences with Israel in comparison to the Palestinian approach. In particular, they underplayed the Palestinian question insisting that they were taking any Egyptian position. However they made it clear that this was not the Arab position (as distinguished from the Egyptian position), and that if asked to appear with Palestinians vis-a-vis Israelis, they would have to take the Arab position, which on this matter was the position of the Palestinians.

This was some two years before the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. It should have been no surprise to us when later no Egyptian agreed to come to the workshop. Each Egyptian gave perfectly good reasons, but reasons no different in kind from those hesitations of Palestinians and Israelis who did come. The Israelis, for their part, became much more reluctant to participate if only Palestinians were to be present with them. One Israeli did drop out but was replaced.

The Israelis appeared in the pre-workshop session more conciliatory than in the workshop itself, more critical of their own government and more acceptable of elements of the Palestinians' claims. The Palestinians on the other hand were less conciliatory privately with workshop organizers than in the presence of the Israelis. The total rejection of any Israeli claim was stronger in private, and the willingness to resort to religious explanations and attacks was also more prevalent in private.

This noteworthy reversal was even more striking in the Pakistan-Bangladesh-India workshop. The Indians were privately quite at ease and conciliatory. They conceded that their government was wrong on the Kashmir question, they expressed strong belief in the possibility and desirability of peaceful coexistence, they

swore to non-interference in Pakistan affairs, and they rejected as silly any idea that they would want to reunite all of pre-independence India under one flag. In the presence of the Pakistanis, they were more contemptuous of Pakistani claims, staunchly defended their government's Kashmir position, and entertained with some satisfaction the notion of a reunited India in the context of an exercise of imagining alternate futures.

The Pakistanis in the pre-workshop session were extremely harsh about India and its intentions. Derogation of Hinduism was free flowing, there was a great dwelling on internal Indian strife and mistreatment of the Moslem minority. The Pakistanis expressed great certainty about Indian designs to dismember Pakistan. Yet in the presence of the Indians, the Pakistanis, though angry, searched for compromise and did not engage in any attacks on Hinduism. The theme of Indian designs on Pakistan was played down compared to its centrality in the pre-workshop session.

On the other hand, in relation to Bangladesh, the Pakistanis seemed much less militant in the pre-workshop session. The Pakistanis accepted many Bengali arguments about West Pakistan's treatment of East Pakistan, now Bangladesh. Even on the Bangladesh issue their venom was reserved for the Indians. In the workshop itself, the Pakistanis were not willing to concede any mistreatment of former East Pakistan. In speaking of "so-called Bangladesh" they vigorously denied any history of religious discrimination, economic exploitation, or political disenfranchisement. When these points were raised by the Bengalis, the Pakistanis refused to concede points that they had raised themselves in the pre-workshop session.

The Bengalis themselves were very harsh on their views of the Pakistanis in the pre-workshop session. They placed great emphasis on atrocities and on being treated as an inferior Moslem sect. In the workshop sessions the hostility turned into a colder variety. There was no overt reference to atrocity experiences and religious issues were emphasized less than the economic issues.

The religious element of a conflict seems to be of great internal emotional significance but is much less likely to emerge in the presence of the other side. It may be that it is perceived as indelicate to discuss in public. Or it may be perceived as too emotional an issue to raise as it proved to some extent in the joke above told by a Palestinian. Furthermore there seems to be some reversal as to the effect of the presence of the enemy depending on the relationship between the parties. First however, some additional comparisons.

2) Within-group solidarity and tolerance for internal dissent

Among the Israelis, disagreement was tolerated and openly exhibited in the pre-workshop session. Israelis addressed each other often, took issue with each other and interrupted each other. In the presence of the Palestinians, the Israelis spoke to each other less and showed more consensus and agreement with each other.

In the final act of the workshop drama, the Israelis were signing a document in return for Palestinian agreement that they had acted in good faith, and not in return for any Palestinian signing. One Israeli gave a reason for not signing and none of the Israelis voiced a word against him or attempted to cajole him into signing. There was a tacit agreement and solidarity under stress.

Among the Palestinians, disagreement was obvious to the listener in the workshop sessions, but it was moderate. In the presence of the Israelis the attempts to maintain solidarity were very great but the strains on it were much more exaggerated than in the pre-workshop session. In the pre-workshop session, the Palestinians seldom spoke to each other or disagreed with each other openly. In the workshop sessions, they carefully agreed with each other, helped to support each other's claims, and caucused to maintain agreement.

The Israelis tolerated and indeed experienced, a high level of internal disagreement in the pre-workshop session, but found a spirit of solidarity and agreement in the presence of the Palestinians. The Palestinians gave evidence of disagreement in the pre-workshop session, but did not acknowledge it. However, in the workshop they came close to overt disagreement and went to great lengths to prevent the strain from emerging as an open split in their ranks.

The Indians were able to tolerate joking disagreement and even strong mutual criticism in the pre-workshop session. In the workshop, they spoke with a single voice, that of an acknowledged spokeswoman. The Pakistanis had difficulty maintaining their complete unity, but were able to do so on the Kashmir issue where they took a unified position of intense but cold anger.

The Bengalis were most instructive in this regard. In the pre-workshop session they differed but not overtly: they did not acknowledge any difference of opinion nor interrupt each other. The Bengalis who had experienced least suffering from the war tried to explain to the organizers the hostility of the

other Bengalis, almost apologizing for it. When he began to express similar sentiments in the workshop, the others fell silent and glum and privately chastised him. When he saw this he changed his tone and started speaking more strongly.

3) Style of Leadership

In the initial phase of the group process leadership fell to the person who was the direct contact with the workshop organizers. This contact power had "expert power" in that he had the fullest knowledge of the situation of the workshop and its ramifications. In some cases the contact also helped recruit some of the others.

This initial hierarchy soon gave way to a more conventional hierarchy based on some measure of social status outside the workshop. (This happened more quickly in the Pakistan-India-Bangladesh case because their recruitment was not channelled only through one person.)

The status hierarchy was generally based on conflict related expertise. One element was personal experience of suffering from the conflict. For the Bengalis the experience of the recent war was a source of status. Among the Palestinians there was some differentiation of kinds of refugee experience.

The other aspect of presumed expertise was professional occupation. Among Israelis status in the professional hierarchy was measured by level of professional achievement. The same was true for the Indians. However, the Palestinians looked to acquired official political status, as did the Pakistanis. This composite of external status determined the hierarchy as the workshop itself began.

However, in each group leadership gravitated to the most militant member of each party. For the Palestinian Arabs, maintaining group cohesion involved acknowledging the leadership legitimacy, in practice, if not in theory, of the least conciliatory participant. This despite the fact that another participant had recognized higher external status. Israeli leadership gravitated from the person who was the most conciliatory, who was the contact person with the organizers, to a more tough-minded, strong-willed person, even though here too there was a higher status participant. The same process ccould be seen in the other workshop.

More moderate persons, especially among the Palestinians and Bengalis attempted to find points of conciliation. Such attempts were abandoned when they threatened to bring internal strife within these groups. The maintenance of solidarity proved stronger than the motive for conciliation.

It is very tempting to interpret the pattern of these results as a reflection of the relative power of the parties involved. The effect of meeting the other side seems to depend on whether one is the more or less powerful party. The less powerful seem to emphasize the maintenance of their internal solidarity. By shedding some of their most hostile expressions of attitude they allow, however reluctantly, the leadership to flow toward the more militant position. (These comparisons are only meant relative to their own positions and not as a judgment as to whether a relatively moderate position is indeed moderate from any objective standpoint.) The religious antagonism is put aside though the political position seems to remain stable.

The more powerful party seems to only awake to the depth of hostility of the other side in the confrontation. This realization reduced the motive for conciliation. Perhaps the group also realized that if the power differential is such, then there is no need to be conciliatory whereas in their privacy they are more cognizant of the costs of conflict from this and other parties to conflict. This set of findings however deserves careful repeated "testing" before too much theory is built upon it.

Workshop Content: The Negotiations of Identity

Each of the parties in the workshops seemed to be wrestling not only with the other side, but with itself. If the struggle with the other side reached its greatest intensity in the pursuit of the recognition of one's national identity, the inner struggle reflected the uncertainty of one's definition of that identity because of its multi-dimensional nature.

The emphasis on national identity is not the only aspect of content of workshop discussions that could be emphasized but it does seem that the most intense conflict and most difficult moments centered around these issues. After

Pakistan had carefully and painstakingly described the weave of Islam and nationalism in the Pakistani national identity, the Indian woman (who until that time had been the model of tact, if not moderation) blurted out, "If that is your conception then the whole Pakistani nation needs a psychiatrist."

National identity in each of these cases involves some mixture of the following elements:

1) Nation as a territorial attachment;
2) Nation as a semi-secularized form of religious solidarity;
3) Nation as a common history or historical experience;
4) Nation as that collectivity of people which is engaged in nation-building regardless of the reasons that the collectivity is delimited in the way it is;
5) Nation as the result of actions of other hostile groups;
6) Nation as commonality of language and culture.

Each of these elements has differential power for each group and each has different implications for the contending group. Some definitions of identity are more likely to perpetuate the conflict and others are more likely to suggest particular forms of solution. What is important to note is that each group in itself moves through various stresses on the definition of identity. The reason that negotiation of identity is the preferred term is that the process of internal definition seems inseparable from the conflict itself. Each side is anxious to foist on its enemy a definition that does not require much concession on its part. Each in turn is reluctant to give up any aspect of identity under duress and may emphasize elements which are not so important except for their contradiction of the other side's hopes.

The existence of these multiple identities may allow each side to believe that its enemy will one day abandon some central identity element that comes into conflict with some aspect of one's own identity. India represents for Pakistan in her very existence the threat of a state which claims to have many Moslems whose national identity is not coterminous with their religious identity. This is seen as inherently destabilizing. For this among other reasons there is a great

emphasis on evidence of religious discrimination in India against Moslems.

In the Israeli case, some Palestinians would like to see the Jewish identity in a pure religious form come to the fore as the definition of identity, cut off from national claims. Others emphasize the hope that an Israeli national identity will be more an Israeli state and less a Jewish state. Some Israelis for their part try to move the Palestinians to de-emphasize the territorial aspects of the Palestinian identity and others instead imagine a Palestinian identity remote from the Arab element of Palestinian identity.

The negotation within each group is paralleled by the negotiation between groups. Conflict may be a resultant among other things of the attempt to satisfy all elements of identity rather than choosing among them which are of highest priority.

If this is true of creation of conflict, then it may be that conflict resolution can not be seen only as a between group process, but as much a within group process. Internal strife may be the requisite for conflict resolution between groups.

These speculations will be carried further with more specific examination of the two cases in another paper. However it should be clear that the process by which intra-party communication is created as seriously as between party communication, detailed in the early sections of the paper may not be only a methodological innovation. It may be a window to an essential overlooked element of the whole process of conflict resolution and an opportunity for exploring the complexities of internal identity conflicts.

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